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Summary. We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two rms com-
pete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows
both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete
information about rm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game
and the unique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if rm 1's cost advantage is below
some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost
type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the
location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may
prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations
dier quite signicantly from the full information equilibrium locations.
Resume. Nous proposons ici un modele simple d'information incomplete en theorie de la localisation.
Deux entreprises s'arontent dans un contexte a deux etapes: une etape de localisation sequentielle et
une etape de concurrence en prix. La rme 1 conna^t sa technologie a cou^t marginal constant et celle
de la rme 2 mais cette derniere n'a qu'une information imparfaite de la technologie de sa concurrente.
La concurrence de premiere etape s'avere e^tre un jeu de signal monotone et l'equilibre D1 unique est un
equilibre separateur en strategies pures si l'avantage de cou^t de la rme 1 est relativement faible et sinon,
un equilibre melangeant, si la probabilite a priori que la rme 1 soit de type cou^t faible est elevee, ou un
equilibre semi-melangeant, si cette probabilite est faible. Ce resultat surprenant est du^ au fait que l'ecart
de localisation entre les rmes est naturellement borne, ce qui peut empe^cher la separation des types. Ainsi,
les localisations d'equilibre d'information incomplete dierent signicativement des localisations d'equilibre
d'information complete.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One important aspect of spatial competition has been neglected so far by location theorists, namely the
incompleteness of the information structures. It is our objective in this paper, developing an analysis only
sketched in [1], to fully characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria when the source of incomplete
information pertains to one entrepreneur's production conditions, namely cost, which are unobserved by
the competitor.
We consider a spatial competition model fairly simple and standard but capable of addressing such a
complex issue as incomplete information in location theory. Two rms compete in a two stage framework:
a long run rst stage of sequential location choices and a short run second stage of simultaneous choices
of delivered price schedules made once the locations chosen are observed. Firm 1 is assumed to have a
superior information structure in the following sense. It knows both its own technology and that of Firm
2, whereas the latter knows its own technology and has incomplete information about what the rst mover
rm's technology is. The location space is represented by an interval over which there is a continuum of
consumers uniformly distributed. This way of modeling spatial competition under incomplete information
may be justied as follows. First, location choices are typically long run decisions, while pricing decisions
are typically short run decisions. It is therefore reasonable to model competition over both locations and
prices as a two stage competition, the second stage or short run stage coming into play once the long run
decisions have been made and observed by both rms. Modeling the space of locations as a linear segment
stems from the fact that in the alternative basic space used in location theory, that is, a circular market with
a uniform density of identical consumers and transportation costs depending only on the distance between
the consumer and the rm, the choice of location by the informed rm cannot provide useful information
to the uninformed rm, since any location is a perfect replication of any other one (see [5], [9], and [10]
for recent surveys). To make the circular model amenable to signaling possibilities, one could make the
distribution of consumers non-uniform. But for analytical purposes, it would then become isomorphic to
the line segment. Hence, the segment with a uniform density of identical consumers is the simplest spatial
structure allowing signaling. We model the short run pricing competition as a Bertrand competition on
delivered price schedules for two reasons. First, it allows us to avoid the problem of existence of equilibrium
encountered in the case of mill pricing (see [4]) and to concentrate our eorts on the incomplete information
in the long run stage and second, it is a non-negligible aspect of many empirical situations. Lederer and
Hurter [11] refer to such price schedules as discriminatory pricing through the absorption of transportation
costs; they claim it is typical, in oligopolistic markets, of goods with low value relative to the transportation
costs and low price elasticity of demand such as cement, plywood, fertilizer, sugar, etc. On competition in
delivered price schedules, see also [2], [6], [7], and [13].
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The one-sided information structure we consider, namely a better informed rst mover who may or
may not have a cost advantage on the second mover, represents one of many possible incomplete infor-
mation structures, other possibilities being, for instance, a better informed second mover and a two-sided
incomplete information. Making the second mover better informed would rule out the possibility of sig-
naling. The information structure we consider here has the advantage of simplicity, a desirable property
for an introduction of incomplete information in location theory, and corresponds also to many practical
situations.
The main results of this paper are as follows. The rst stage location game turns out to be a monotonic
signaling game as dened by Cho and Sobel [3] for which equilibrium renement D1 selects a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. We will be able to characterize the type of D1 equilibrium arising under all possible
values of the parameters of the model, namely the cost advantage of the rst mover and the priors. We
will show that when the cost dierential is below some bound, the only D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy
separating equilibrium. But for values of the cost discrepancy above this bound, the D1 equilibrium will
not be a separating equilibrium. This might seem surprising at rst sight because one might have expected
that for large cost dierences, it would be easier for the low cost rst mover to dierentiate itself from its
high cost twin. But in a spatial context such as the present one, the location gap between the two types
of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, preventing the separation of the two types.
Hence, the equilibria robust to D1 may be either pooling equilibria or semi-pooling equilibria according
to whether the prior probability, that Firm 1 is of the low cost type, is high or low. Hence, incomplete
information matters: the equilibrium locations so predicted may be quite dierent from the full information
equilibrium locations. In [1], we examined, using the same model, the case in which the rms plays only
pure strategies, thus excluding those equilibria which are intrinsically mixed strategy equilibria such as
the semi-separating equilibria. We worked with Cho and Kreps' intuitive criterion in order to discriminate
among the equilibria. This criterion, weaker than D1, fails to eliminate all the pooling equilibria but one.
It can be shown also that it is not very ecient in the selection of semi-separating equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, we give the denitions
of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Section 4 presents the D1 equilibrium renement concept,
the limit posterior probability function and the review of the basic results of Cho and Sobel on strategic
stability in monotonic signaling games. We characterize in section 5 the whole set of PBE and identify
those which are robust to renement D1. We briey conclude in section 6.
2. THE MODEL
Let us denote by i = 1; 2 the two competing rms: Firm 1 being the rst mover and Firm 2, the
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follower. Each rm can produce at some constant average (hence marginal) cost the same basic product,
whatever its location. The average production cost of Firm 1 is commonly known to be either c   with
probability  or c with the complementary probability 1 , where c >
1
=
2
and  2 (0;
1
=
2
). As for Firm 2
its constant average cost is c. Firm 1 knows before choosing its own location which production cost (which
type)  2 fc  ; cg it will have at the production stage. The transportation costs are the same for both
rms: each rm must support a cost dq to deliver q units to customers located at a distance d from its
own plant. Both rms compete in delivered prices.
Consumers are spread evenly on the interval [0; 1] with a density of 1. Each consumer demands inelasti-
cally one unit of the basic good produced by any one of the two rms, provided that its delivered price not
be higher than some reservation value r, which is the same for all the consumers on the segment line. We
will assume that r > 1+ c so that each rm could get some part of the market, whatever the locations and
the type  of Firm 1, when both are charging delivered prices equal to their full unit costs, production plus
transportation costs. We will also assume as in [11] that if a consumer is charged the same price by both
rms, he will then buy from the supplier who makes the highest prot on his demand. Remember that at
the production or market stage of the game the true cost of Firm 1 is known. If both rms are making the
same prot on its purchase, then a consumer will buy from either one with an arbitrary probability, say
 2 (0; 1) from Firm 1. The exact value of  does not play any role in the determination of the equilibrium.
At the rst stage of the game, Firm 1 knowing its proper cost  chooses some location on the segment
line [0; 1], which will be denoted by x
1
, the distance between the 0-end of the segment and the plant
location. Observing the location of Firm 1 but unaware of the true cost of its competitor, Firm 2 then
chooses its own location x
2
, again the distance between the 0-end of the segment and its plant. After that,
the true cost of Firm 1 is unveiled, a fairly standard modeling feature since Milgrom and Roberts [12] and
a short cut for a whole revelation process of the true type of Firm 1.
At the second stage of the game, the two rms move simultaneously, competing in delivered prices.
This second stage is a complete information game. The strategy of Firm i in this game is denoted by
p
i
(; ; ; ), meaning that for locations x
1
and x
2
and for Firm 1's type , Firm i will charge a delivered
price p
i
(x; x
1
; x
2
; ) to a consumer located at x. Under the above assumptions, it is shown in Hurter and
Lederer [11] that the equilibrium of this game is given by:
p
i
(x; x
1
; x
2
; ) = p(x; x
1
; x
2
; ) = maxf + jx  x
1
j; c+ jx  x
2
jg; i = 1; 2; (1)
that is, the equilibrium strategies are the same for the two rms. Without loss of generality, we can suppose
that Firm 1 is located on [0;
1
=
2
] and Firm 2 on [x
1
; 1]. Hence at equilibrium the market is split into two
areas: Firm 1 sells to those customers located in [0;
1
=
2
(x
1
+ c  + x
2
)), Firm 2 to the consumers located
3
in (
1
=
2
(x
1
+c +x
2
); 1], the consumers located precisely at
1
=
2
(x
1
+c +x
2
) being distributed between
the two rms, the percentage that each one gets having no impact on its own prots.
Let 
i
(x
1
; x
2
; ); i = 1; 2, be the prot of Firm i at the equilibrium of the second stage subgame:

1
(x
1
; x
2
; ) =
1
=
4
(x
2
  x
1
)(3x
1
+ x
2
) + ()(
1
=
2
(x
1
+ x
2
) +
1
=
4

2
) (2)

2
(x
1
; x
2
; ) = (x
2
  x
1
)(1 
1
=
4
(x
1
+ 3x
2
)) + ()(
1
=
2
(x
1
+ x
2
)   +
1
=
4

2
) (3)
where
() =
(
0 if  = c
1 if  = c  
(4)
From (2) and (3), we may determine the complete information subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole
game. From 
2
(x
1
; x
2
; ) we get x
2
(x
1
; ), the best reply location function of Firm 2, if at the rst stage,
the proper cost of Firm 1 is common knowledge:
x
2
(x
1
; ) =
1
=
3
(2 + x
1
+ ()) (5)
Substituting x
2
(x
1
; ) for x
2
in 
1
() gives 
1
as a concave function of x
1
, and maximizing 
1
on the
interval [0;
1
=
2
] gives the complete information equilibrium location of Firm 1 as a function of the cost
discrepancy  :
x

1
= x
1
() = minf
2
=
5
+ ()(
4
=
5
);
1
=
2
g; (6)
hence, after substitution in x
2
(x
1
; ) :
x

2
= x
2
(x

1
; ) = minf
4
=
5
+ ()(
3
=
5
);
5
=
6
+ ()(
1
=
3
)g: (7)
As the cost advantage of Firm 1 increases, it moves nearer to the center of the market where it stays for
 
1
=
8
. Also as  increases, Firm 2 moves to the right, being pushed at the extreme 1-end of the market
when  approaches
1
=
2
. Should  be greater than
1
=
2
, then Firm 2 would be driven out of the market.
Note, however, that the distance between the two rms rst decreases when  <
1
=
8
and then increases
when  >
1
=
8
. But the market area of Firm 1 is always increasing. The border delimiting the two areas is
given by:
x

B
() = maxf
3
=
5
(1 + 2);
2
=
3
(1 + )g (8)
The equilibrium prots are:
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1
(x

1
; x

2
; ) = (1  ())(
1
=
5
)
+ ()[()(
1
=
5
(1 + 2)
2
) + (1  ())(
1
=
36
(7 + 32+ 16
2
))] (9)

2
(x

1
; x

2
; ) = (1  ())(
3
=
25
)
+ ()[()(
3
=
25
(1  3)
2
) + (1  ())(
1
=
12
(1  2)
2
)] (10)
where () is dened as:
() =
(
1 if  
1
=
8
0 otherwise.
(11)
3. THE PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA: DEFINITIONS
Since at the end of the rst stage the true cost of Firm 1 is unveiled and the second stage subgame is
solved according to (1), we may consider the sole rst stage which appears as a signaling game. The signal
here is the location choice of Firm 1 from which Firm 2 will try to infer the type of Firm 1 in order to locate
itself optimally. We are therefore looking for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the location choice
game. Depending upon the parameters of the problem, that is, the prior  and the cost discrepancy , there
may be separating equilibria in which Firm 1's location reveals its type, pooling equilibria in which the
location of Firm 1 is the same for both types and therefore reveals nothing regarding its production cost,
and nally, semi-separating equilibria in which at least one type of Firm 1 chooses its location at random,
sometimes revealing its type and sometimes choosing the same location as the other type. However, in
this last case, contrary to the pooling case, Firm 2 gets additional information from observing the location
common to both types.
A mixed strategy of Firm 1 is a mapping 	
1
() :  !M
1
, where  = fc  ; cg is the set of types of
Firm 1 and M
1
the set of probability measures dened on [0;
1
=
2
]. We will denote by M
1
() a cumulative
distribution for the location x
1
of Firm 1 and by M
1
(; ) the cumulative selected by 	
1
() for . In the
case of pure strategies, we simply denote the location decision function of Firm 1 by x
1
() : ! X
1
, where
X
1
= [0;
1
=
2
]. We proceed similarly for Firm 2. From (5) we know that with complete information the
most distant location from the 1-end of the segment, which would be chosen by Firm 2, is x
2
=
2
=
3
. The
incomplete information will not alter this bound, as shown by equation (12) below. Hence, we may restrict
the support of M
2
to the subsegment [
2
=
3
; 1] without loss of generality. A mixed strategy of Firm 2 is a
mapping 	
2
() : X
1
!M
2
, where M
2
is the set of probability measures dened on X
2
= [
2
=
3
; 1]. We will
denote by M
2
() a cumulative distribution for the location x
2
of Firm 2 and by M
2
(; x
1
) the cumulative
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distribution selected by 	
2
() for x
1
. In the case of pure strategies, we simply denote the location decision
function of Firm 2 by x
2
() : X
1
! X
2
. Finally, we need conditional distributions giving for each location
in X
1
the posterior probability on  that Firm 2 will use in deciding its location. Let (jx
1
) be the
posterior probability on , given that x
1
has been observed. For any probability measure M, we denote
by Supp M the support of M, and for any function f , we denote by Rf the range of f .
A PBE is a triplet f	

1
();	

2
(); 

(j)g such that:
(i) 8 2  : 	

1
() 2 argmax
M
1
()
Z
X
1
Z
X
2

1
(x
1
; x
2
; ) dM

2
(x
2
; x
1
)dM
1
(x
1
);
(ii) 8x
1
2 X
1
: 	

2
(x
1
) 2 arg max
M
2
()
Z
X
2
X
2


(jx
1
)
2
(x
1
; x
2
; )dM
2
(x
2
; x
1
);
(iii) 8x
1
2 [
2
Supp 	

1
(), 

( jx
1
) is obtained by applying Bayes' rule to the prior distribution
(; 1  ), given that x
1
has been observed, otherwise 

( jx
1
) is arbitrary.
For pure strategy equilibria fx

1
(); x

2
(); 

(j)g, we have:
(i
0
) 8 2  : x

1
() 2 arg max
x
1
2X
1

1
(x
1
; x

2
(x
1
); );
(ii
0
) 8x
1
2 X
1
: x

2
(x
1
) 2 arg max
x
2
2X
2
X
2


(; x
1
)
2
(x
1
; x
2
; );
(iii
0
) 8x
1
2 Rx

1
(), 

(jx
1
) is obtained by applying Bayes' rule, otherwise 

(jx
1
) is arbitrary.
Any function 

(j) satisfying (iii) or equivalently (iii
0
) will be referred to as a Bayesian posterior belief
function. In order to simplify the notation, we will often simply denote by  the probability with which
Firm 2 believes that Firm 1 is of the low cost type.
Now, maximizing E
2
(x
1
; x
2
; ) = 
2
(x
1
; x
2
; c   ) + (1   )
2
(x
1
; x
2
; c), we obtain ~x
2
(x
1
; ), the
best reply of Firm 2 to the location x
1
of Firm 1 under the posterior  taken here as a parameter:
~x
2
(x
1
; ) =
1
=
3
(2 + x
1
+ ): (12)
Since the best reply is unique given x
1
and , Firm 2 always uses only pure strategies in equilibrium. Note
that ~x
2
(; ) is an increasing function of x
1
, , and .
Let
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) = 
1
(x
1
; ~x
2
(x
1
; ); ) be the prot function of Firm 1 of type  located at x
1
, given
that Firm 2 chooses its location optimally, believing with probability  that Firm 1 if of the low cost type.
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) is a strictly concave function of x
1
and an increasing function of  for both values of , as
shown in Appendix A. Denoting as x
1
(; ) the optimal location of Firm 1 of type  if it is believed by
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Firm 2 to be of the low cost type with probability , we obtain by maximizing
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) in the interval
[0;
1
=
2
] :
x
1
(; ) = (1  ())(
1
=
5
(2 + )) + ()minf
1
=
5
(2 +  + 3);
1
=
2
g: (13)
We may rephrase the denition of a PBE in terms of 	
1
(),
^

1
(), and (j) functions. The pair
f	

1
(); 

(j)g is a mixed strategy PBE if:
(a) 8 2  : 8x

1
2 Supp 	

1
(): x

1
2 arg max
x
1
2X
1
^

1
(x
1
; 

(c  jx
1
); );
(b) 

(j) is a Bayesian posterior belief function.
Similarly, fx

1
(); 

(j)g is a pure strategy PBE if:
(a
0
) 8 2  : x

1
() 2 arg max
x
1
2X
1
^

1
(x
1
; 

(c  jx
1
); );
and (b)
It is rather self-evident from the proofs of Propositions 3, 4, and 5 that even if the use of mixed strategies
with a continuous support were allowed, in equilibrium only mixed strategies with nite supports would
be used. Hence, although the set of pure strategies is a continuum in the present model, we will limit
ourselves to mixed strategies whose support is nite, and we will denote by X
1
the set of locations over
which Firm 1 of type  randomizes and by 
1
(x
1
j);  2 , the probability with which it chooses x
1
.
As usual in the incomplete information context, for a given situation (; ), there exists a continuum of
equilibria, and sometimes simultaneously a whole range of separating, pooling, and semi-pooling equilibria,
hence the need for a selection device.
4. THE D1 EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT IN MONOTONIC GAMES
Among the numerous renements that have been proposed, the D1 criterion is quite powerful for a
special class of signaling games, namely the monotonic signaling games. For such games one and only one
equilibrium is robust to the D1 criterion. In this section, we rephrase the denition of the D1 renement
in terms of our location model, and we introduce the notion of the limit posterior belief function that will
be used repeatedly in our study of the dierent kinds of equilibria. Last, we show that the present game
is monotonic.
4.1 The D1 Equilibrium Refinement
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Let X

1
= [
2
X

1
be the set of equilibrium locations or signals and
~
X
1
= [0;
1
=
2
]nX

1
the set of o-
the-equilibrium signals, the latter locations being chosen with probability 0 in equilibrium. As we saw in
the denition of a PBE, the posterior (jx
1
) is arbitrary for such locations x
1
2
~
X
1
. Renements serve
as reasonable restrictions on (jx
1
). Criterion D1 is a way to dene reasonable beliefs.
Consider a given PBE, f	

1
();	

2
(); 

(j)g, and let 

1
() be the prot of Firm 1 of type  in that
equilibrium. Recall that in the case of mixed strategies, all the locations in X

1
give the same prots to
type , that is: for x

1
and x
0
1
in X

1
, 

1
() = 
1
(x

1
; ~x
2
(x

1
; 

); ) = 
1
(x
0
1
; ~x
2
(x
0
1
; 
0
); ), where


= 

(c  jx

1
) and 
0
= 

(c  jx
0
1
). Also recall that for any location x
1
and any posterior belief
, there is a unique location ~x
2
(x
1
; ) which is the best response to x
1
, given . Let us dene BR(x
1
; )
as fx
2
jx
2
= ~x
2
(x
1
; )g and BR(x
1
) as [
2[0;1]
BR(x
1
; ) = fx
2
j9 : x
2
= ~x
2
(x
1
; )g. The set BR(x
1
; )
contains only one element, namely the best response location of Firm 2 to x
1
given . As for BR(x
1
), it
is the set containing all the \possible" best response locations to x
1
, that is, each location x
2
which is a
best response to x
1
for some posterior probability  2 [0; 1]. Let us now dene:
D(jx
1
) = fx
2
2 BR(x
1
)j

1
() < 
1
(x
1
; x
2
; )g;
D
0
(jx
1
) = fx
2
2 BR(x
1
)j

1
() = 
1
(x
1
; x
2
; )g:
The set D(jx
1
) is the subset of BR(x
1
) containing those locations x
2
which, if chosen by Firm 2, would
justify a switch by Firm 1 of type  from either one of its equilibrium locations to the o-the-equilibrium
location x
1
. Its prots are higher at (x
1
; x
2
), x
2
2 D(jx
1
), than at (x

1
; ~x
2
(x

1
; 

)), 

= 

(c  jx

1
),
whatever x

1
2 X

1
. Similarly, the set D
0
(jx
1
) is the set of x
2
2 BR(x
1
) which make a switch to x
1
a
no gain / no loss proposition.
Since ~x
2
(x
1
; ) and therefore BR(x
1
; ) increase in , and since 
1
(x
1
; x
2
; ) increases in x
2
, we can
express the sets D() and D
0
() in terms of  rather than x
2
, a substitution simplifying the use of criterion
D1, as follows:
D(jx
1
) = fj

1
() <
^

1
(x
1
; ; )g; (14)
D
0
(jx
1
) = fj

1
() =
^

1
(x
1
; ; )g: (15)
Clearly, since
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) increases in , the set D(jx
1
), if nonempty, will include all the values of 
above some critical value for which 

1
() =
^

1
(x
1
; ; ), value which is indeed the only element of the set
D
0
(jx
1
) if nonempty. Before characterizing this critical probability value, let us state criterion D1. Again,
consider a given PBE, f	

1
();	

2
(); 

(j)g, and an o-the-equilibrium signal x
1
. Then:
f9 ; 
0
;  6= 
0
: D(jx
1
)[D
0
(jx
1
)  D(
0
jx
1
)g =) 

(jx
1
) = 0: (16)
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In other words, if Firm 1 of type 
0
has an incentive to deviate when Firm 1 of type  has a weak incentive
to deviate, then Firm 2 should not assign a positive probability that x
1
has been chosen by Firm 1 of
type . Phrased dierently, criterion D1 stipulates that it is reasonable to suppose with probability 1 that
the o-the-equilibrium location x
1
has been chosen by the type which has the most to gain from it, in the
precise sense of (16).
4.2 The Limit Posterior Probability Function
The critical posterior probability value is the key to the characterization of the sets of the dierent
kinds of equilibria and to the application of renement D1. Let us consider the set of locations of Firm 1
of type  not strictly dominated by some given ( _x
1
; _), that is, the set of locations x
1
such that there exist
beliefs  with
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) 
^

1
( _x
1
; _; ). As
^
() is strictly concave in x
1
and increasing in , this set is
an interval [x
min
( _x
1
; _; ); x
max
( _x
1
; _; )] where x
min
() is the smallest root of the second order equation
^

1
(x
1
; 1; ) =
^

1
( _x
1
; _; ), which is always positive, and x
max
() is the largest root if less than
1
=
2
and
equal to
1
=
2
otherwise.
Consider a location x
1
2 [x
min
( _x
1
; _; ); x
max
( _x
1
; _; )]. Let (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ) be either the solution of
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) =
^

1
( _x
1
; _; ) if such a solution exists, or 0 if not. For example, suppose x
1
(0; ) <
1
=
2
and consider _x
1
= x
1
(0; )+ <
1
=
2
,  > 0, and _ = 0; since
^

1
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ) >
^

1
(x
1
(0; )+; 0; ) and
^
(; ; ) is increasing in , the equation
^

1
(x
1
(0; ); ; ) =
^

1
(x
1
(0; )+; 0; ) has no solution. As far
as (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ) > 0, it is the highest value of  for which Firm 1 of type  will prefer to stay at _x
1
and face a Firm 2 with posterior _ rather than to switch to x
1
and face a Firm 2 with posterior . For
x
1
2 [0; x
min
( _x
1
; _; )) [ (x
max
( _x
1
; _; );
1
=
2
], let (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ) be equal to 1; then for any x
1
2 [0;
1
=
2
], a
switch from ( _x
1
; _) to (x
1
; ) is undesirable for Firm 1 of type  if  < (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ).
Note that if (x
0
1
; 
0
) and (x
00
1
; 
00
) give the same prots to Firm 1 of type , that is, if
^

1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; ) =
^

1
(x
00
1
; 
00
; ), then for any x
1
: (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; ) = (x
1
; x
00
1
; 
00
; ). Since in equilibrium
^

1
(x

1
; 

; ) =
^

1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; ) whenever fx

1
; x
0
1
g  X

1
, 

= 

(c   jx

1
) and 
0
= 

(c   jx
0
1
), using the limit
probability function, we may redene criterion D1 as follows: it is reasonable for Firm 2, observing x
1
, to
assign probability 0 to type  and probability 1 to the other type 
0
if (x
1
; x

1
; 

; ) > (x
1
; x

1
0
; 
0
; 
0
),
where 

= 

(c  jx

1
) and 
0
= 

(c  jx
0
1
). Indeed, we can rewrite (14) and (15) as follows:
8 2 ; 8x

1
2 X

1
:
D(jx
1
) = fj > (x
1
; x

1
; 

; )g; (17)
D
0
(jx
1
) = fj = (x
1
; x

1
; 

; )g: (18)
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What makes the use of the limit posterior probability functions an easy and ecient device to determine
the locations robust to D1 in the present location model are the following single crossing properties of the
(x
1
; _x; _; ) functions.
Proposition 1: Let two pairs of locations and posterior beliefs (x
0
1
; 
0
) and (x
00
1
; 
00
) be such that:
x
0
1
2 [x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)]; (19)

0
 (x
0
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); (20)
x
00
2 [x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )]; (21)

00
 (x
00
1
; x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ): (22)
If there exists a third pair ( _x
1
; _) such that:
_ < 1 and ( _x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; c) = _ = ( _x
1
; x
00
1
; 
00
; c  );
then this last pair is unique. k
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 2: Let ( _x
1
; _) be such that:
 either _ < 1; and ( _x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; c) = _ = ( _x
1
; x
00
1
; 
00
; c   ) for some pairs (x
0
1
; 
0
) and (x
00
1
; 
00
)
satisfying respectively (19), (20), and (21), (22) (23)
 or _ = 1; _x
1
= x
min
( _x
1
; _; );  2 , and _x
1
 x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) (24)
 or _ = 1; _x
1
= x
max
( _x
1
; _; );  2 , and _x
1
 x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) (25)
then:
 for any x
1
2 (x
min
( _x
1
; _; c); _x
1
):
(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) < (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ) (26)
 for any x
1
2 ( _x
1
; x
max
( _x
1
; _; c  )):
(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) > (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ): k (27)
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Proof: See Appendix B.
The working of propositions 1 and 2 is illustrated on Figure 2 (Appendix C) and Figures 3 and 4
(Appendix E). The fundamental property underlying these propositions is that, for any given (x
1
; _x
1
; _),
such that (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ) < 1;  2 , we have:
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c)
@x
1
=  
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; c)=@x
1
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; c)=@
>  
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; c  )=@x
1
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; c  )=@
=
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  )
@x
1
In other terms, the absolute value of the ratio of marginal prots with respect to location and posterior
beliefs (to be identied as a low cost type) is always higher for the high cost type than for the low cost
type. Since at x
1
= _x
1
we have (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) = _ = (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ), then the above inequality implies
both proposition 1 and proposition 2.
4.3 Monotonic Games and the Uniqueness of D1 Equilibrium
The sequential spatial model we consider in this paper is a monotonic signaling game, as dened by Cho
and Sobel [3]. They show that in such games, the equilibrium renement criteria D1, universal divinity
(UD), and never a weak best response (NWBR) are all equivalent, hence lending additional support for
using D1 in the present context. Cho and Sobel's denition of a monotonic signaling game, expressed in
terms of our model, is as follows: the location game is monotonic if 8x
1
2 [0;
1
=
2
], 8x
2
and x
0
2
2 BR(x
1
),
whenever one type of Firm 1 prefers (x
1
; x
2
) to (x
1
; x
0
2
), the other type of Firm 1 does so as well. Since
@
1
(x
1
; x
2
; c)=@x
2
> 0 and @
1
(x
1
; x
2
; c  )=@x
2
> 0, we have for all locations x
2
and x
0
2
2 [
1
=
2
; 1], and
a fortiori for those in BR(x
1
):
f
1
(x
1
; x
2
; c) > 
1
(x
1
; x
0
2
; c)g i f
1
(x
1
; x
2
; c  ) > 
1
(x
1
; x
0
2
; c  )g :
Each inequality implies x
2
> x
0
2
which, in turn, implies the other inequality.
Let us redene the types of Firm 1 from  2  = fc   ; cg to  2 f0; g so that the high cost type
appears as the lower type, which is the one trying to imitate the higher type. This will be useful in [A6]
below. Cho and Sobel's sucient conditions to obtain the existence and uniqueness of a D1-equilibrium are
the following: [A1] the set of signals, that is, the set of possible locations of Firm 1, is a compact interval,
and the set of actions by the receiver, that is the set of possible locations of Firm 2, is also a compact
interval; [A2] 
1
(x
1
; x
2
; ) is continuous in (x
1
; x
2
) for all  2 f0; g; [A3] monotonicity as dened above;
[A4] 
2
(x
1
; x
2
; ) is a continuous function of (x
1
; x
2
) for all  and a strictly quasi-concave dierentiable
function of x
2
; [A5] @
2
(x
1
; x
2
; )=@x
2
is a strictly increasing function of  ; [A6] if  < 
0
and x
1
< x
0
1
,
then f
1
(x
1
; x
2
; )  
1
(x
0
1
; x
0
2
; )g ) f
1
(x
1
; x
2
; 
0
) < 
1
(x
0
1
; x
0
2
; 
0
)g; [A7] 8 , 
1
(x
1
; x
2
(x
1
; ); ) is a
strictly quasi-concave function of x
1
.
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It is clear that A1 and A2 hold in the present game and we just showed that A3 is also satised. It
is straightforward to verify that A4 holds, and noting that  increases from 0, for the high cost type, to
, for the low cost type, it is easy to check that A5 is satised too. Condition A6 states that if the high
cost Firm 1 makes at least as much prot in situation (x
0
1
; x
0
2
) as in situation (x
1
; x
2
) with x
0
1
> x
1
, then
the low cost Firm 1 does strictly better in (x
0
1
; x
0
2
) than in (x
1
; x
2
). This condition is indeed implied by
a single crossing property:  (@
1
=@x
1
)=(@
2
=@x
2
) is decreasing with  . This expression is equal here to
(3x
1
  x
2
  )=(x
1
+ x
2
+ ),  2 f0; g. Hence, condition A6 is satised. Finally, 
1
(x
1
; x
2
(x
1
; ); )
is strictly concave in x
1
for both values of  . Hence, A1 to A7 are veried. For each situation in the
(; )-space, there exists a unique D1 equilibrium in the present location model.
5. THE PERFECT BAYESIAN D1 EQUILIBRIA
For each type of equilibrium, we describe the set of equilibria and identify those which are robust to
D1. This will allow us to draw a map in the (; )-space, giving the unique equilibrium predicted in each
possible situation dened by (; ) for  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0;
1
=
2
).
5.1 The Separating Equilibria
When they exist, such equilibria are pure strategy equilibria, the high cost Firm 1 locating at x
1
(0; c) and
the low cost type locating within [x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c )], provided that this interval
not be degenerate. This will be the case if the cost discrepancy is not too high, at most equal to some limit
we will denote by ^
c
. As shown in Appendix C, for  < ^
c
: x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)< x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c );
for   ^
c
: x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) =
1
=
2
and (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c)  1, with the
equality if  = ^
c
and the strict inequality if  > ^
c
. The value of ^
c
is 9=
p
5  4 <
1
=
2
. For  < ^
c
there
exists a whole continuum of pure strategy equilibria, whose measure rst increases from 0 at x = 0 and
then decreases and goes back to 0 at  = ^
c
. For  = ^
c
, there exists a unique separating equilibrium,
and for  > ^
c
, no separating equilibrium exists. When there exists a continuum of equilibria, the only D1
equilibrium is the least distorting equilibrium, as measured with respect to the full information equilibrium.
More precisely, we have:
Proposition 3: All the separating equilibria are pure strategy equilibria. Such equilibria exist if the
cost discrepancy is not too high, namely if  2 [0; ^
c
], whatever the priors. If  2 (0; ^
c
), there exists a
continuum of separating equilibria: x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) and x

1c 
2 [x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c 
12
)], each one supported by any posterior beliefs function 

(c  jx
1
) such that:


(c  jx
1
)
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
= 0 if x
1
= x

1c
;
= 1 if x
1
= x

1c 
;
 min

(x
1
; x

1c
; 0; c); (x
1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  )
	
otherwise.
If  = ^
c
, there exists only one separating equilibrium: x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) and x

1c 
=
1
=
2
, supported by the
same kind of posterior beliefs. For  2 (0; ^
c
], the unique D1 equilibrium among the separating equilibria
is the following: x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) and x

1c 
= x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c). k
Proof: See Appendix C.
Since from (13), x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)> x
1
(1; c ) when   ^
c
, then the D1 separating equilibria involve
a distortion in the location of Firm 1. Although Firm 1 of the high cost type locates at its full information
location, Firm 1 of the low cost type generally locates to the right of its full information location, closer
to the center of the market. But the distortion is the smallest possible, given the incomplete information
structure, compatible with a separating equilibrium.
5.2 The Pooling Equilibria
As for the case of separating equilibria, pooling equilibria are always pure strategy equilibria. Now, we
must distinguish both according to the values of  and the value of the prior belief . For any cost advantage
, there is a whole range of pooling equilibria, whose measure increases with , generally sustained by a
continuum of prior beliefs and Bayesian posterior belief functions. However, the unique pooling equilibria
surviving the application of criterion D1 is the one in which both types of Firm 1 locate at the center of
the market, provided that the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is higher than a strictly
positive bound. We have:
Proposition 4: All the pooling equilibria are pure strategy equilibria. For any cost discrepancy  2
(0;
1
=
2
), each location x

1
2 (x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) may be a pooling equilibrium
location, provided that:
{ the prior  be suciently high:
  max f(x

1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; );  2 g ;
{ the posterior belief function 

(c  jx
1
) satisfy:


(c  jx
1
)
(
= ; if x = x

1
 minf(x
1
; x

1
; ; );  2 g; otherwise.
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D1 pooling equilibria exist i   (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) and  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
), in which case the surviving
equilibrium is the center of the market: x

1
=
1
=
2
. k
Proof: See Appendix D.
The incomplete information pooling equilibrium, given , selected by criterion D1 is always quite
dierent from the full information equilibrium for the high cost Firm 1, now locating at the center of
the market instead of x
1
(0; c) <
1
=
2
. For the low cost type, we must distinguish according to the values
of . Remember that under full information, the low cost type locates at x
1
(1; c   ) <
1
=
2
if  <
1
=
8
and x
1
(1; c   ) =
1
=
2
for  
1
=
8
. Since ^
c
= (9=
p
5)   4 <
1
=
8
, the location will be distorted only if
 2 (^
c
;
1
=
8
). Note, however, that even when the location of the low cost type is not distorted, the doubt
subsisting about its true type is prejudicial: Firm 2 will locate nearer the market center than under full
information. On the contrary, the high cost Firm 1 will always be better o at the D1 pooling equilibrium.
5.3 The Semi-Separating Equilibria
In all the semi-separating equilibria, each type of Firm 1 plays at most two dierent locations and there
may be only one location common to the both types, so that we have only two kinds of such equilibria:
those in which each type  randomizes over two locations, a location x

1
specic to its type and a location
x

1
common to both types, and those in which one of the types, say , randomizes over fx

1
; x

1
g and the
other type, 
0
6= , plays x

1
, a pure strategy.
The only kind of semi-separating equilibria existing for all the values of the cost discrepancy  is the one
in which only the high cost type randomizes, provided that the prior  be suciently low. For the other
kinds, in which either the two types randomize or only the low cost type plays a mixed strategy, the cost
advantage of the low cost type must not be too high, whatever the prior  in the rst case, for suciently
high values of  only in the second case. In all the equilibria where the high cost type plays a specic
location x

1c
, it is then perfectly identied; hence, this location must be x
1
(0; c), the location maximizing
its prots when clearly perceived as the high cost type. The other locations are less constrained and there
generally exists a whole range of possible equilibrium positions.
The equilibrium selected by D1 is for the low cost Firm 1 to locate at the center of the market and
for the high cost Firm 1 to randomize over its full information location x
1
(0; c) and the center of the
market, if  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
) and  < (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c). Hence, the low cost Firm 1 locates to the right of its
full information location, while the high cost Firm 1 locates with some probability at its full information
location and with the complementary probability at the market center.
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In order to characterize the whole set of semi-separating equilibria, we introduce the following notewor-
thy locations. We denote by x^
1
the location for which (x
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = (x
1
; x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ) < 1,
that is:
x^
1
=
(
1
=
5
(
2
+ 6+ 4)
1=2
; if  2 [0;
1
=
6
]
(7920
2
  240+ 1)
1=2
=180; otherwise.
Clearly, x
1
(0; c) < x^
1
< x
1
(0; c  ). For  2 (0; ^
c
) and x
0
1
2 (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c 
)), we dene x
1
(x
0
1
) as the location for which (x
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = (x
1
; x
0
1
; 1; c  ) < 1. This location
is also depending on  and x
1
(0; c) < x
1
(x
0
1
) < x
1
(1; c  ). Finally, let us denote by ^
c 
the upper
bound of the values of  for which x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) <
1
=
2
: ^
c 
= 26   15
p
3 < ^
c
. For any
 2 (^
c 
; ^
c
), we dene x
1
as the location at which
^

1
(x
1
; (x
1
; x; (0; c); 0; c); c  ) =
^

1
(
1
=
2
; 1; c  ),
a location depending on . We have:
Proposition 5: In all the semi-separating equilibria, there exists one and only one location chosen in
equilibrium by both types of Firm 1, and each type chooses two dierent locations at most.
(i) There exists a continuum of equilibria in which both types of Firm 1 randomize i  2 (0; ^
c
],
whatever . The equilibrium locations are the following:
x

1c
= x
1
(0; c);
x

1
8
<
:
2 [x^
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) if  2 (0; ^
c 
];
2 [x
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) if  2 (^
c 
; ^
c
];
x

1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ):
These equilibrium locations are supported by the posterior beliefs:


(c  jx
1
)
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
= 0; if x
1
= x

1c
;
= (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); if x
1
= x

1
;
= 1; if x
1
= x

1c 
;
 minf(x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); );  2 g; otherwise,
and, given (; ) and x

1
, by a whole range of randomizations f
1
(x

1
jc); 
1
(x

1
jc  )g.
(ii) For any  2 (0;
1
=
2
), there exists a continuum of equilibria in which only the high cost Firm 1
randomizes provided that  be suciently low, in which case the equilibrium locations are as follows:
x

1c
= x
1
(0; c);
x

1
8
<
:
2 [x^
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)); if  2 (0; ^
c
];
2 [x^
1
;
1
=
2
]; if  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
);
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each one supported by:


(c  jx
1
)
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
= 0; if x
1
= x

1c
;
= (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); if x
1
= x

1
;
 minf(x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); );  2 g; otherwise,
and, given (; ) and x

1
, by only one mixed strategy 
1
(x

1
jc) of the high cost type; the condition on
 is:  < 

(c  jx

1
).
(iii) There exists a continuum of equilibria in which only the low cost type of Firm 1 randomizes i
 2 (0;
1
=
8
), provided that  be suciently high. The equilibrium locations are as follows:
x

1c 
2 (x
1
(1; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )];
x

1
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
2 (x
min
(x

1c 
; 1; c  ); x

1c 
);
if, for any  2 (0;
1
=
8
); x

1c 
2 (x
1
(1; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)];
2 (x
min
(x

1c 
; 1; c  ); x
1
(x

1c 
)];
if  2 (0; ^
c
] and x

1c 
2 (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )]:
These equilibrium locations are supported by:


(c  jx

1
)
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
= 1; if x
1
= x

1c 
;
= (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ); if x
1
= x

1
;
 minf(x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); g;  2 g; otherwise,
and, given (; ) and x

1
, by only one mixed strategy 
1
(x

1
jc  ) of the low cost type; the condition
on  is:  > (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ).
(iv) D1 semi-separating equilibria exist if  < (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) and  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
). If (; ) is in this
region, then the unique semi-separating equilibrium robust to D1 is this equilibrium in which only
the high cost Firm 1 randomizes over the locations: x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) and x

1
=
1
=
2
. k
Proof: See Appendix E.
5.4 The Mutually Exclusive Domains
Recapitulating from the previous subsections, we have that:
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? for  2 (0; ^
c
];  2 (0; 1), that is, for region I on Figure 1, the unique D1 equilibrium is the separating
equilibrium which involves the least cost of separation;
? for  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
);  2 [(
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); 1), that is, region II on Figure 1, the unique D1 equilibrium
is the pooling equilibrium at the market center;
? for  2 (^
c
;
1
=
2
);  2 (0; (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c)), that is, region III on Figure 1, the unique D1 equilibrium
is the semi-separating equilibrium where only the high cost Firm 1 randomizes over its full information
equilibrium and the market center, and the low cost rm 1 plays a pure strategy at the market center.
Figure 1 about here
What fundamentally happens is that for low cost discrepancies we get the classical result: the two types
choose dierent locations in equilibrium, the most ecient one incurring a separating cost, the less ecient
one staying at its complete information location. For the ecient type, the separation cost comes from the
fact that it must locate nearer the market center than it would have chosen under complete information. As
the cost discrepancy increases, the most ecient type would have to go beyond
1
=
2
, say
1
=
2
+, with  > 0,
in order to separate from its less ecient twin. All this would work smoothly if Firm 2 were constrained
to stay within (
1
=
2
+ ; 1]. The problem is that Firm 2 is free to choose the most convenient location for
itself and switches within [0;
1
=
2
+ ) once Firm 1 goes beyond
1
=
2
. Hence, the separating power of
1
=
2
+ 
is not greater than the separating power of
1
=
2
   and the ecient type stays at
1
=
2
. Doing so creates an
incentive for the less ecient type to imitate the more ecient one. But imitation may really succeed only
if the prior probability  that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is suciently high, because Firm 2's reaction
depends on this probability for a given location of Firm 1. If this probability is too low, the pooling process
is blurred: the high cost Firm 1 will imitate its low cost twin only with a probability less than 1, hence
generating a mixed strategy equilibrium.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has made use of Cho and Sobel [3] to exhibit the outcome of spatial competition, as pre-
dicted by the recent developments of the theory of incomplete information games. It provides an exhaustive
description and prediction of the variety of distortions in locations which can arise because of incomplete
information. Clearly, incomplete information appears to have a major inuence on location choices. Al-
though the less ecient type of Firm 1 chooses its complete information location in separating and, with
some probability, in semi-separating equilibria, it will locate nearer to the center of the market, otherwise;
as for the most ecient type, for all the values of the cost advantage for which the full information location
is not at the market center, the incomplete information location is nearer to the market center than the
17
complete information one. Hence, the incomplete information always results in a more aggressive price
competition.
From the point of view of signaling models, our model provides an economically meaningful example
of the usefulness of the D1 renement to narrow down successfully and dramatically the set of equilibria.
There are not so many examples of such applications.
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APPENDIX A: PROPERTIES OF THE
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) FUNCTIONS
Substituting ~x
2
(x
1
; ) =
1
=
3
(x
1
+ x + 2) for x
2
in the Firm 1's prot function (2): 
1
(x
1
; x
2
; ) =
1
=
4
(x
2
  x
1
)(3x
1
+ x
2
) + ()[
1
=
2
(x
1
+ x
2
) +
1
=
4

2
], where () = 0 if  = c and () = 1 if  = c  , we
get:
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) =
1
=
36
[ 20x
2
1
+ 8(2 +  + 3())x
1
+ (2 +  + 3())
2
] (A.1)
with
@
^

1
@
=
1
=
36
[8x
1
+ 2(2 +  + 3())] > 0 ;
@
2
^

1
@
2
=
1
=
18

2
(A.2)
@
^

1
@x
1
=
1
=
9
[ 10x
1
+ 2(2 +  + 3())] ;
@
2
^

1
@x
2
1
=  
10
=
9
< 0 (A.3)
@
2
^

1
@x
1
@
=
2
=
9
x
1
> 0: (A.4)
The
^

1
(:) functions are strictly concave in x
1
so that the location x
1
(; ) maximizing
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) is
unique and equal to:
x
1
(; ) = (1  ())[
1
=
5
(2 + )] + ()minf
1
=
5
(2 +  + 3);
1
=
2
g: (A:5)
Note that for a given , the two intervals [x
1
(0; ); x
1
(1; )];  2 , do not intersect. Substituting
x
1
(; ) for x
1
in
^

1
(x
1
; ; ), we get:
^

1
(x
1
(; ); ; ) = minf
5
=
4
x
1
(; )
2
;
1
=
36
[3 + 4(+ 3)+ (2 +  + 3)
2
]g: (A:6)
Hence, since the two intervals [x
1
(0; ); x
1
(1; )];  2 , do not intersect:
^

1
(x
1
(1; c); 1; c)<
^

1
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  );  2 (0;
1
=
2
): (A:7)
APPENDIX B: THE LIMIT POSTERIOR PROBABILITY FUNCTION
In this appendix, we give all the relevant characteristics of the limit probability functions
(x
1
; _x
1
; _; );  2 .
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(B.1) For the high cost Firm 1 correctly identied as such and located at its prot maximizing location,
that is, for  = c; _ = 0; _x
1
= x
1
(0; c) (=
2
=
5
<
1
=
2
), we have:
x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
1
=
5
(2 +  
1=2
); (B.1)
x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
8
<
:
1
=
5
(2 +  +
1=2
); if   ^
c
= (9=
p
5)  4;
1
=
2
; otherwise,
(B.2)
where  = 9(
1
=
4

2
+ ). The limit probability function (x
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) is continuous and equal
to 1 on [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)], decreasing from 1 to 0 on (x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
1
(0; c)], increasing
from 0 to 1 on (x
1
(0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)] if the upper bound of this interval is lower than
1
=
2
,
and remaining equal to 1 on (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
1
=
2
], increasing from 0 to a value less than 1 on
(x
1
(0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)] if x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
1
=
2
.
(B.2) For the low cost Firm 1 wrongly identied as a high cost one and optimally located given this
misperception, that is, for  = c  ; _ = 0, _x
1
= x
1
(0; c  ) (either equal to
1
=
5
(2 + 3) if  
1
=
6
or to
1
=
2
if  >
1
=
6
), we have:
x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) =
8
<
:
1
=
5
(2 + 4  

1=2
); if 
1
=
6
;
1
=
10
(4 + 8  ,
1=2
); otherwise,
(B.3)
x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) =
8
<
:
1
=
5
(2 + 4  

1=2
); if  ^
c 
= 26  15
p
3;
1
=
2
; otherwise,
(B.4)
where 
 = 9(
7
=
4

2
+ ) and , = 99
2
+ 24 + 1. The limit probability function (x
1
; x
1
(0; c  
); 0; c  ) is continuous and equal to 1 on [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c  )], decreasing from 1 to 0 on
(x
min
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ); x
1
(0; c )], increasing from 0 to 1 on (x
1
(0; c ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c 
)] if x
1
(0; c  ) < x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) <
1
=
2
(note that the second inequality implies the
rst) and remaining equal to 1 on (x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  );
1
=
2
], increasing from 0 to a value less
than 1 on (x
1
(0; c ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c )] if x
1
(0; c ) < x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ) =
1
=
2
.
(B.3) There are important relationships between the limit posterior probability functions (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) and
(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ), dened for a given ( _x
1
; _). By denition:
{ the two functions have the same value _ at x
1
= _x
1
:
( _x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) = ( _x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ) = _; (B:5)
{ each function assumes a value less than 1 within the interval (x
min
( _x
1
; _; ); x
max
( _x
1
; _; )):
x
1
2 (x
min
( _x
1
; _; ); x
max
( _x
1
; _; ))) (x
1
; _x
1
; ) < 1; (B:6)
20
{ dening A

as the following interval:
A

=
8
>
>
<
>
:
(x
min
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ); x
max
(x
1
(0; ); 0; )); if either   ^
c
and  = c
or   ^
c 
and  = c  ;
(x
min
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ); x
max
(x
1
(0; ); 0; )]; otherwise,
(B.7)
then:
x
1
2 A

) (x
1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; )< 1; (B.8)
x
1
=2 A

) (x
1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; ) = 1: (B.9)
(B.4) Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Let (x
0
1
; 
0
), (x
00
1
; 
00
) and ( _x
1
; _) be such that:
x
0
1
2 [x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)]; 
0
 (x
0
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
x
00
1
2 [x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )]; 
00
 (x
00
1
; x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  );
_ < 1 and ( _x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; c) = _ = ( _x
1
; x
00
1
; 
00
; c  ):
Note that: (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; c) = (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) and (x
1
; x
00
1
; 
00
; c  ) = (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  ).
For any x
1
2 [x
min
( _x
1
; _; ); x
max
( _x
1
; _; )];  2 , let (x
1
; _x
1
; _; ) be the relevant root of:
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) =
^

1
( _x
1
; _; )
Dierentiating this equation we get:
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; )
@x
1
=  
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; )=@x
1
@
^

1
(x
1
; ; )=@
that is, from (A.2) and (A.3):
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c)
@x
1
=
 40x
1
+ 8(2 + )
8x
1
+ 2(2 + )
;
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  )
@x
1
=
 40x
1
+ 8(2 +  + 3)
8x
1
+ 2(2 +  + 3)
:
Hence:
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c)
@x
1
=
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  )
@x
1
+
2
2
3
3
x
1
(4x
1
+ 2 + )(4x
1
+ 2+  + 3)
: (B.10)
Since
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c)
@x
1
>
@(x
1
; _x
1
; _; c  )
@x
1
;
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then ( _x
1
; _) is the unique pair satisfying the two conditions _ < 1 and (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c) = _ = (x
1
; _x
1
; _; c )
for x = _x
1
. (B.10) and the continuity of the functions (x
1
; : : : ; );  2 , imply Proposition 2.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The logic underlying the construction of a separating equilibrium is illustrated on Figure 2, where the
prot functions
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) are represented as functions of x
1
.
Figure 2 about here
The curves (1), (2), and (3) correspond respectively to
^

1
(x
1
; 1; c  ), to
^

1
(x
1
; ; c  ) for 0 <  < 1,
and to
^

1
(x
1
; 0; c  ), that is, respectively, to the prots of the low cost Firm 1 when rightly identied
by Firm 2 ( = 1), when some doubt subsists about its type (0 <  < 1) and when wrongly identied as
the high cost type ( = 0). Curves (1
0
), (2
0
), and (3
0
) correspond respectively to
^

1
(x
1
; 1; c),
^

1
(x
1
; ; c)
for 0 <  < 1, and to
^

1
(x
1
; 0; c), that is, respectively, to the prots of the high cost type Firm 1 when
wrongly identied as the low cost type, when not clearly distinguished from its low cost twin and when
rightly identied as of the high cost type. Curve (4) is the locus of maxima of the functions
^

1
(x
1
; ; ),
 2 . Remember that in a separating equilibrium the two types of Firm 1 choose dierent locations, that
is
X

1
\ X

1
0
= ;,  6= 
0
. Hence 8 2 , 8x

1
2 X

1
: 

(c  jx

1
) = ().
Consider rst the high cost type and suppose that x
1
6= x
1
(0; c) and x
1
2 X

1c
. Trivially,
^

1
(x
1
; 0; c) <
^

1
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) <
^

1
(x
1
(0; c); ; c) if  > 0. Since at x
1
2 X

1c
, Firm 1 of the high cost type must be
rightly identied as such, the above inequality implies that deviating from x
1
to x
1
(0; c) would be protable,
whatever the posteriors of Firm 2 observing the deviation. Hence, the only possible equilibrium location
of the high cost type of Firm 1 is x
1
(0; c), which implies that for this type mixed strategies are forbidden.
In order that x
1
(0; c) be the equilibrium location of the high cost type, the posteriors induced by any
o-the-equilibrium location x
1
6= x
1
(0; c), 

(c  jx
1
), must be at most equal to (x
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c), that
is, strictly less than 1 on the interval A
c
(see (B.7) and (B.8)).
Consider the low cost type. Its equilibrium location may not be within [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c ))[
(x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c );
1
=
2
], since in this interval
^

1
(x
1
; 1; c ) <
^

1
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c )<
^

1
(x
1
(0; c 
); ; c ); 0 < . A deviation from any given x
1
in the above interval to x
1
(0; c ) would be protable,
whatever the posteriors of Firm 2 observing the deviation. Note also that its equilibrium location may not
be within the interval A
c
, since for any alleged equilibrium location x
1
in this interval, we would have: (1)


(c jx
1
) < 1 (in order that the high cost type stays at x
1
(0; c)) and (2) 

(c jx
1
) = 1 (in order that
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the low cost type be rightly identied as such). Because x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) < x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )
and x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ), the whole interval [0; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) is excluded.
Hence, we are left with the sole interval [x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  )]. This interval is
nonempty, provided that (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = 1, which is the case if   ^
c
. In this case,
^

1
(x
1
; 1; c  ) is decreasing on this interval so that the low cost type may not randomize over several
locations, that is to say, mixed strategies are also forbidden for the low cost type. Any location within this
last interval may be the equilibrium location of the low cost type, provided that for any o-the-equilibrium
location x
1
; 

(c  jx
1
)  (x
1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ).
Let us now turn to the working of D1. We rst show that any equilibrium x

1c 
> x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c 
) is destroyed by D1. For such a location, consider any alternative location x

1
2 (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
x

1c 
). First, we have (x
0
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = (x
0
1
; x

1c
; 0; c) = 1. Second, since
^

1
(x
1
; 1; c  ) is decreasing
on (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x

1c 
), then (x
0
1
; x

1c 
; 1; c   ) < 1. Therefore, observing x
0
1
, Firm 2 should
conclude, according to D1, that it is facing the low cost type. But
^

1
(x
0
1
; 1; c  ) >
^

1
(x

1c 
; 1; c  ) =


1
(c   ) implies that the deviation is protable for the low cost type. Let us now show that x

1c 
=
x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) is robust to D1. For this equilibrium location, the above kind of deviation is no more
allowed. Consider rst deviations either in [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)] or in (x

1c 
;
1
=
2
]: no type would gain,
whatever the posterior beliefs of Firm 2. Consider now deviations x
0
1
within (x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x

1c 
):
from Proposition 2 (substitute x

1c 
= x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) for _x
1
in (25), note that (x

1c 
; x; (0; c); 0; c) =


(c   jx

1c 
) = 1 = _ and apply (26)), we get (x
0
1
; x

1c
; 0; c) < (x
0
1
; x

1c 
; 1; c   ), so that, ac-
cording to D1, Firm 2 should conclude that it is facing the high cost Firm 1. Since
^

1
(x

1c 
; 1; c  ) >
^

1
(x

1c 
; (x

1c 
; x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ); c ) =
^

1
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c )
^

1
(x
0
1
; 0; c ), such a deviation
would imply a loss for the low cost type. As for the high cost type we have
^

1
(x
0
1
; 0; c)
^

1
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c),
with the strict inequality if x
0
1
6= x
1
(0; c), so that the deviation is worthless.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In a pooling equilibrium, the equilibrium locations chosen by the two types of Firm 1 are the same,
X

1
= X

1
;  2 , and if mixed strategies are used, the probabilities with which the two types randomize
over X

1
are the same so that observing any x

1
2 X

1
, the posterior beliefs of Firm 2 must be equal to the
priors: 

(c  jx

1
) = . Thus, the equilibrium prots of the high and low cost types amount respectively
to
^

1
(x

1
; ; c) and
^

1
(x

1
; ; c  ).
For each type , the equilibrium prots must be at least equal to
^

1
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ) that type  would
obtain by choosing the location maximizing its prot when perceived, right or wrong, as the high cost type.
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If not, the type  in question would be sure to obtain higher prots by deviating from the alleged equilibrium
to x
1
(0; ) (the argument is the same as for separating equilibria, but as we shall see, the consequences
dier because we are looking for a dierent kind of equilibrium). Hence, for any prior  2 (0; 1); any
equilibrium location must be within the following interval A:
A =
\
2
A

(D:1)
that is:
A =
(
(x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)); if   ^
c
;
(x
min
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  );
1
=
2
]; otherwise.
(D.2)
In order that a location x

1
2 A be an equilibrium location, it is necessary that  be at least equal
to maxf(x

1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; );  2 g and that for any o-the-equilibrium location x
0
1
, the posterior beliefs


(c   jx
0
1
) not be too high, namely 

(c   jx
0
1
)  minf(x
0
1
; x

1
; ; );  2 g. If either one of these
conditions were to fail for some type , this type would deviate protably from x

1
to either x
1
(0; ) or x
0
1
,
according to whether it is the rst or the second condition which is not met. It is important to note that
maxf(x
1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; );  2 g is strictly positive for any x
1
2 A, so that the lower bound of the range of
values of  for which pooling equilibria exist, is strictly positive. On the other hand, there is no restriction
on the range of values of the cost discrepancy . If the play is in pure strategies, the above conditions are
also sucient.
Let us remark that if both types of Firm 1 were playing mixed strategies, that is, randomizing over
locations x
0
1
; x
00
1
; : : : ; the prots of each type would have to be the same at each one of these locations:
^

1
(x
0
1
; ; ) =
^

1
(x
00
1
; ; ) = : : : ;  2 ; (D:3)
given that x
0
1
; x
00
1
; : : : are all within the interval A and that  satises the condition laid down in the
last paragraph for each one of these locations. Let us also remark that since
^

1
(x
1
; ; ) is concave in x
1
,
then equation (D3) can be veried for a type  by at most two dierent locations. But if two locations
verify (D3) for some type , then the same locations do not verify (D3) for the other type 
0
6= . It
is an immediate consequence from Proposition 2. Substitute in (23) x
0
1
for _x
1
,  for _, x
0
1
for x
0
1
, x
00
1
and  for 
0
and 
00
. Then it follows from (26) and (27) that if x
00
1
6= x
0
1
and fx
00
1
; x
0
1
g  A, then
(x
00
1
; x
0
1
; ; c) 6= (x
00
1
; x
0
1
; ; c  ), so that x
00
1
cannot be another equilibrium location. Hence, pooling
equilibria must be pure strategy equilibria.
Let us now show how the D1 renement may be used in order to eliminate either all the pooling
equilibria, or all the pooling equilibria but one, depending on the values of  and . From Cho and So-
bel's results, we know that in the present model there is for each situation (; ) a unique PBE robust
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to D1. Hence, since we have already identied for each  2 (0; ^
c
] and each  2 (0; 1) a separating
equilibrium robust to D1, no pooling equilibrium survives D1 in this region. So let us concentrate on
the region where  > ^
c
. In this region, we have x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = x
max
(x
1
(c   ); 0; c  ) =
1
=
2
.
Let us rst show that if a location _x

1
<
1
=
2
is an equilibrium location, implying that the prior _ sat-
isfy _  maxf( _x

1
; x
1
(0; ); 0; );  2 g, this equilibrium does not survive D1. Consider any alterna-
tive location x
0
1
2 ( _x

1
; x
max
( _x

1
; _; c)). From Proposition 2 we know that for such a deviation we have
(x
0
1
; _x

1
; _; c   ) < (x
0
1
; _x

1
; _; c). Hence observing x
0
1
, Firm 2 should conclude, according to D1, that
it is facing the low cost type of Firm 1. Then from x
0
1
< x
max
( _x

1
; _; c)  x
max
( _x

1
; _; c   ), we have
^

1
(x
0
1
; 1; c ) >
^

1
( _x

1
; _; c ), so that Firm 1 of the low cost type will deviate. Last, let us show that any
equilibrium x

1
=
1
=
2
, with priors   maxf(
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; ); 0; ) 2 g, is robust to D1. For any deviation
x
0
1
2 [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)], we have
^

1
(x
0
1
; ; ) <
^

1
(
1
=
2
; ; );  2 ;  2 [0; 1], hence no type will deviate.
For deviation x
0
1
2 (x
min
(0; c); 0; c);
1
=
2
), we get from Proposition 2: (x
0
1
;
1
=
2
; ; c) < (x
0
1
;
1
=
2
; ; c  ).
Therefore according to D1, Firm 2 should conclude that it is facing the high cost type of Firm 1. Then
^

1
(x
0
1
; 0; ) 
^

1
(x
1
(0; c); 0; )
^

1
(
1
=
2
; ; ),  2 , so that no type will deviate.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
In a semi-separating equilibrium, the supports of the strategies chosen by the two types intersect and
for one type at least, the support is larger than the intersection.
(E1) Characterization of the set of semi-separating equilibria.
As for separating and pooling equilibria, any location x
1
played at equilibrium by the type ;  2 ,
must be such that
^

1
(x
1
; 

(c   jx
1
); ) is at least equal to
^

1
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ). Hence, any one of
these locations must be within

A

the closure of A

dened in (B.7):

A

= [x
min
(x
1
(0; ); 0; ); x
max
(x
1
(0; ); 0; )]: (E:1)
However, if x

1
is a location chosen by both types, then x

1
must be within A

since the Bayesian
posterior belief 

(c  jx

1
) is strictly less than 1:


(c  jx

1
) =

1
(x

1
jc  )

1
(x

1
jc  ) + (1  )
1
(x

1
jc)
< 1: (E:2)
Suppose now that there exist two locations x
0
1
and x
00
1
both played by the two types of Firm 1 at
equilibrium. For these two locations we must have:
^

1
(x
0
1
; 

(c  jx
0
1
); ) =
^

1
(x
00
1
; 

(c  jx
00
1
); );  2 : (E:3)
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But from Proposition 1, it is clearly impossible that this equality be veried for both types. Hence,
in any semi-separating equilibria one and only one location is played by both types.
(E1a) Let us rst examine the case where the high cost type is randomizing and the low cost type plays in
pure strategy the location x

1
also played by the other type.
Consider rst the high cost type. Since for any location x

1c
specic to this type at equilibrium the
high cost Firm 1 is perfectly identied, only one such location exists, the location maximizing the
high cost type prot when rightly identied:
x

1c
= x
1
(0; c): (E:4)
The Bayesian posterior belief of Firm 2 observing x

1
is equal to:


(c  jx

1
) =

 + (1  )
1
(x

1
jc)
< 1: (E:5)
Whatever 

(c   jx

1
) < 1, there exists a probability 
1
(x

1
jc) 2 (0; 1) satisfying (E.5) if  <


(c  )jx

1
). The high cost type must be indierent between x

1
and x

1c
:
^

1
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
^

1
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c); (E:6)
hence:
x

1
2

A
c
and 

(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c): (E:7)
Last, in order that the high cost type does not deviate to any o-the-equilibrium location x
1
=2
fx

1c
; x

1
g, the posteriors must verify:


(c  jx
1
)  (x
1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c): (E:8)
Consider now the low cost type. In order that it does not deviate from x

1
to x
1
(0; c), we must have:


(c  jx

1
)  (x

1
; x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) and x

1
2

A
c 
: (E:9)
Any deviation to an o-the-equilibrium location x
1
6= x

1
is prevented by posteriors satisfying:


(c  jx
1
)  (x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ): (E:10)
From Proposition 2 and the denition of x^
1
as the location x
1
satisfying (x
1
; x; (0; c); 0; c) =
(x
1
; x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ), the two conditions (E.7) and (E.9) can be met i x

1
2 [x^
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)).
In this case all other conditions are satised, provided that  < 

(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c):
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(E1b) Let us examine now the equilibria where the low cost type randomizes and the high cost type plays
a pure strategy x

1
.
Consider rst the low cost type. The common location x

1
and all its specic locations x
0
1c 
; x
00
1c 
; : : :
must be within

A
c 
:
x

1
; x
0
1c 
; x
00
1c 
; : : : ;2

A
c 
: (E:11)
The posterior of Firm 2 observing x

1
now takes the following form:


(c  jx

1
) =

1
(x

1
jc  )

1
(x

1
jc  ) + (1  )
< 1: (E:12)
For any given 

(c   jx

1
) < 1, there exists a randomization 
1
(x

1
jc   ) satisfying (E.12) i
 > 

(c  jx

1
). Since all the locations give to the type c   the same prot, then:
^

1
(x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c  ) =
^

1
(x
0
1c 
; 1; c  ) =
^

1
(x
00
1c 
; 1; c  ) = : : : (E:13)
Hence, there may be at most two specic locations, the rst one being x
0
1c 
< minfx

1
; x
1
(1; c )g.
Note that if  
1
=
8
, x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c  ) = x
1
(1; c  ), so that for those values of  there
exists only one specic location x

1c 
< minfx

1
; x
1
(1; c  )g: (E.11) and (E.13) imply that:


(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x
0
1c 
; 1; c  ) = (x

1
; x
00
1c 
; 1; c  ) (E:14)
x

1
2 [x
min
(x

1c 
; 1; c  ); x
max
(x

1c 
; 1; c  )] (E:15)
where x

1 c 
is either the unique specic location or any one of them if two such locations exist. Last,
for any o-the-equilibrium location x
1
, the following condition must hold:


(c  jx
1
)  (x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ) (E:16)
For the high cost type, we must rst have:
x

1
2

A
c
and 

(c  jx

1
)  (x

1
; x; (0; c); 0; c): (E:17)
If not, the high cost type would deviate from x

1
to x
1
(0; c). For any o-the-equilibrium x
1
the
posteriors must be such that:


(c  jx
1
)  (x
1
; x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ): (E:18)
Finally, additional conditions must be satised in order that the high cost type does not mimic the
low cost type:
^

1
(x
0
1c 
; 1; c) 
^

1
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c) (E:19)
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^
1
(x
00
1c 
; 1; c) 
^

1
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c): (E:20)
Therefore, the specic location x
0
1c 
< x
1
(1; c  ) must satisfy:
x
0
1c 
< x
min
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c) (E:21)
implying that:
(x
min
(x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c); x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c ) < (x
min
(x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c); x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c) = 1:
(E:22)
But from Proposition 2 (with _x
1
= x
0
1
= x
00
1
= x

, and _ = 
0
= 
00
= 

(c   jx

1
) < 1 in (23) and
x
1
= x
0
1 c
in (26)) the inequality (E.20) would have to be in the opposite sense. Hence, there may
exist only one specic location which we will denote by x

1c 
and such that x

1c 
> x
1
(1; c  ),
implying that  must be less than
1
=
8
. Now, let x

1c 
2 (x
1
(1; c ); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)]. Then from
Proposition 2 (with _ = 1 = 

(c jx

1c 
) and _x
1
= x

1c 
in (25) and x
1
= x

1
in (26)), we get for
any x

1
2 (x
min
(x

1c 
; 1; c); x

1c 
):
(x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c)< (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ): (E:23)
Hence, if 
1
(x

1
jc  ) and  are such that:


(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ); (E:24)
then:
{ the high cost type does not mimic the low cost type (by (E.23)), and,
{ since x

1c 
< x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c), then (x

1c 
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c)< (x

1c 
; x

1c 
; 1; c) = 1,
implying that (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c)< (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c)< (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ) = 

(c  jx

1
),
so that (E.17) is also satised.
Last, suppose that  2 (0; ^
c
], so that x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c ) (with the strict
inequality if x < 
c
) and consider a location x

1c 
2 (x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c   ); 0; c  
). In (23), let _x
1
= x
1
(x

1c 
); x
0
1
= x
1
(0; c); x
00
1
= x
1
(0; c   ) and _ = (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
(x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ); 
0
= 0; 
00
= 0. From Proposition 2, we get for any x

1
satisfying (E.11) and
(E.18):
(x

1
; x
1
(x

1c 
); _; c)  (>)(x

1
; x
1
(x

1c 
); _; c  ) = (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ) i x

1
 (>)x
1
(x

1c 
):
(E:25)
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Hence, if x

1
 x
1
(x

1c 
) and  > (x

1
; x
1
(x

1c 
); _; c ), then 
1
(x

1
jc ) may be chosen so that:


(x

1
jc  ) = (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c  ): (E:26)
Thus, recapitulating:


(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x
1
(x

c 
); 1; c   = (x

1
; x

1c 
; 1; c) > (x

1
; x; (0; c); 0; c): (E:27)
Hence (E.17) is satised. Since x

1c 
 x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c), the high cost type does not mimic the
low cost type. Clearly, we may not choose x

1
in the interval (x
1
(x

1c 
); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)), since
by (E.25) we would have (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) > (x

1
; x

1c 
1; c  ), so that both (E.14) and (E.17)
would not be satised.
(E1c) Last, consider the equilibria when both types randomize.
For the high cost type there may only be one specic location:
x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) (E:28)
and the common location must satisfy:
x

1
2

A
c
and 

(c  jx

1
) = (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c): (E:29)
For the low cost type, there may be at most two specic locations, because at each location including
the common one, the prot must be the same:
x
0
1c 
= x
min
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ) and x
00
1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ) (E:30)
with:
x

1
; x
0
1c 
; x
00
1c 
2

A
c 
: (E:31)
Note that in the present case 

(c  jx

1
) is given by:


(c  jx

1
) =

1
(x

1
jc  )

1
(x

1
jc  ) + (1  )
1
(x

1
jc)
(E:32)
so that whatever , there exists a whole range of randomizations f
1
(x

1
jc  ); 
1
(x

1
jc)g satisfying
(E.32).
Let us now examine the self-selection constraint for the high cost type. In order that the high cost
type does not deviate from either x
1
(0; c) or x

1
to either x
0
1c 
or x
00
1c 
, these last two locations
must be: { outside (x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) if  < ^
c
, since for such values of ,
29
xmax
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) 
1
=
2
; { outside (x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
1
=
2
] if   ^
c
, since for such values of ,
x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) =
1
=
2
and (
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c)  1 (the strict inequality if  > ^
c
). Hence, from x
0
1c 
 x
min
(x
1
(0; c  
); 0; c   ) > x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) (the rst inequality form (E.31)), we conclude that the candi-
date specic location x
0
1c 
cannot meet the constraints, whatever . We are thus left with only
one candidate specic location x

1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c   ). However, if  > ^
c 
then
x
max
(x
1
(0; c   ); 0; c   ) =
1
=
2
= x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c), so that the only remaining candidate is
also eliminated. Hence: { if  > ^
c
, there exists no semi-separating equilibrium where both types
randomize; { if   ^
c
, the low cost type randomizes over two and only two locations:
x

1
and x

1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c  jx

1
); c  ): (E:33)
Now, let us suppose that  < ^
c 
implying that x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)< x
max
(x
1
(0; c ); 0; c )
1
=
2
(the inequality strict if  < ^
c 
) (see Figure 3). From Proposition 2, we deduce that in order that
(E.7) and (E.33) be satised, it is necessary that:
x

1
2 [x^
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)): (E:34)
Figure 3 about here
Again, applying Proposition 2 (with _x
1
= x

1
= x
0
1
= x
00
1
and _ = (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c) = 
0
= 
00
in (23)), we know that for x
1
2 (x

1
; x
max
(x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c  )) then (x
1
; x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c) >
(x
1
; x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c ). Hence, by continuity (x
max
(x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c ); x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c) 
(x
max
(x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c   ); x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c   ), so that the high cost type is not incited
to switch to the low cost specic location x

1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c   jx

1
); c   ). Also, since x

1
2
[x^
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) then x

1c 
= x
max
(x

1
; 

(c jx

1
); c ) 2 [x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x
max
(x
1
(0; c 
); 0; c )]. Last, suppose that  2 (^
c 
; ^
c
] so that x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c) x
max
(x
1
(0; c  ); 0; c 
) =
1
=
2
(the rst inequality strict if  < ^
c
). See Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here
For any x

1
2 [x
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)) we have:
x
max
(x

1
; (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); c  ) 2 [x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
1
=
2
]
and
(x
max
(x

1
; (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); x

1
; (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); c  ) = 1
and for any x

1
2 [x^
1
; x
1
):
x
max
(x

1
; (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); c  ) <
1
=
2
30
and
(
1
=
2
; x

1
; (x

1
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c); c  ) < 1:
Hence in this last case, the high cost type would mimic the low cost type. We conclude that the
common location x

1
must be within [x
1
; x
max
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)).
(E2) The working of the D1 criterion.
We know from Cho and Sobel's results that no semi-separating equilibrium survives D1 in regions
where we have already shown that either a separating equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium sur-
vives D1. Therefore, we may restrict the analysis to the region dened by  > ^
c
and  <
(
1
=
2
; x
1
(0; c); 0; c). Consider in this region the equilibria in which only the high cost Firm 1 ran-
domizes over the two locations x

1c
= x
1
(0; c) and x

1
=
1
=
2
. For any x
0
1c
2 (x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c);
1
=
2
),
we get from Proposition 2:
(x
0
1
;
1
=
2
; 

(c  j
1
=
2
); c)< (x
0
1
;
1
=
2
; 

(c  j
1
=
2
); c  ):
Hence observing x
0
1
, Firm 2 should conclude, according to D1, that it is facing the high cost type
of Firm 1. Therefore, neither the high cost type nor the low cost type would gain more than
its equilibrium prot. For deviations x
0
1
2 [0; x
min
(x
1
(0; c); 0; c)], no type would benet from the
deviation, whatever the posteriors of Firm 2 observing the deviation. We conclude that for the
region under consideration, we have identied the unique D1 equilibrium.
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